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Case Comment
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK V. AINSWORTH, [1965] 2 All E.R. 472
(H.L.)-HUSBAND AND WIFE--DESERTED WIFE's RIGHT TO REMAIN
IN OCCUPATION OF THE MATRIMONIAL HOMF,--REGISTERED LAND-
OVERRIDING INTEREST-LAND REGISTRATION ACT, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo.
5, c. 25), s. 70(1) (g)--During the last decade or so there has been
a series of decisions which were the embryonic and infant stages of
what has come to be known as "The wife's equity in the matrimonial
home". The House of Lords has in National Provincial Bank v. Ains-
worth' now put an end to this incipient doctrine. Looking back over
the historical development of the deserted wife's equity it can be
truly said "that in matters of difficulty the more seriously they are
debated and argued, the more truly they are resolved, and thereby
new inventions justly avoided." 2
Beginning with the decision of the English Court of Appeal in
Bendall v. McWhirter,3 and until the present House of Lords decision,
the law had been that a deserted wife could stay in the matrimonial
home against her husband's wishes and against his successors in
title-such as a purchaser, a mortgagee or a trustee in bankruptcy.
The latter were on actual or constructive notice of her right bound
to allow the wife to stay on the premises. The wife's right was a mere
equity which had no legal or equitable status in the law of real
property. Her right was one based on "a licence coupled with an
equity". The law has been summarized by A. G. Guest in his article
in the Canadian Bar Review on the position of the deserted wife
in relation to third parties. He concisely states that, provided one
concedes the deserted wife's right is here to stay,
(1) so long as the marriage subsists4 and she behaves herself,5 a de-
serted wife has a right to remain in the matrimonial home until such
time as the court decides otherwise; 6 (2) this right arises not upon
marriage but from the fact of desertion and so is not enforceable
against prior mortgagees whether legal7 or equitable; 8 (3) it seems that
this right would not be available against a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, but, in the absence of fraud this will rarely occur since
notice of her occupation is notice of her right;9 (4) a person who is not
a purchaser for valuel0 or who buys with full knowledge of the facts1'
stands in no better position than the husband; (5) a purchaser for
1 [1965] 2 All E.R. 471 (H.L.).
2 Coke on Littleton, L.3C.5 Sec. 377, 232b.
3 [1952] 1 All E.R. 1307 (C.A.).
4 Robson v. Headland (1948), 64 T.L.R. 596 (C.A.); Vaughen v. Vaughen,
[1953] 1 Q.B. 672 (C.A.).
5 Middleton v. Baldock, [1950] 1 K.B. 657 (C.A.), at p. 662, per Evershed
M.R.
6 "The court always has a discretion in the matter", [1955] 1 W.L.R. 152
(C.A.) at p. 156, per Denning L.J.
7 Lloyd's Bank v. Oliver's Trustees, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1460 (Ch.D.).
8 Barclay's Bank v. Bird, [1954] Ch. 274 (C.A.).
9 Hunt v. Luck, [1902] 1 Ch. 428 (C.A.).
10 Errington v. Errington, [1952] 1 Q.B. 290 (C.A.); Bendall v. McWhirter,
[1952] 2 Q.B. 466 (C.A.).
11 Street v. Denham, [1954] 1 All E.R. 532 (H.C.); Ferris v. Weaven,
[1952] 2 All E.R. 233 (H.C.).
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value who takes with notice of the wife's occupancy may yet get posses-
sion if it appears he has not full knowledge12 of the facts.13
The latter was the basic legal position in England until N.P.B. v.
Ainsworth. In this case the husband and wife and four infant children
of the marriage lived in a home, title of which was registered. The
husband deserted his wife and left her and the children in the matri-
monial home. The husband went to live with his mother. In 1958, the
husband mortgaged his home to the bank. The mortgage was regis-
tered and the bank had no knowledge of the fact that the husband
and wife were not living together as husband and wife. In 1959,
a company was formed and it took over the husband's business and
properties. The first mortgage was discharged and a new charge
was registered in its place without the bank making any inquiries as
to the occupation of the property. In 1961 the wife became legally
separated from her husband and also obtained an order for per-
manent alimony, which was made on the relevant factor that the wife
and children were being provided with a rent free matrimonial home.
The bank now learned of the matrimonial difficulties, and as the
company did not pay its debt to the bank, the bank issued a summons
for possession of the mortgaged property. The wife applied for an
order to set aside the conveyance of the matrimonial home by the
husband to the company on the grounds that it was defeating her
claim against her husband for financial aid. The conveyance was set
aside and the wife applied for an order that the order for future
possession to the bank be rescinded and that she stay in possession.
The legal problem involves an effort to balance matrimonial
relations and real property rights. The husband and wife have certain
rights between themselves. Prima facie each partner has a right to
the other's consortium, and the wife has a further right to be main-
tained by her husband which consists fundamentally in the pro-
visions of a matrimonial home.14 Lords Hodson, Upjohn and Wilber-
force point out that at no time did the matrimonial law give the wife
any property in the house in which she and her husband lived unless
there had been such a settlement. Her status of wife gives her a
personal right against her husband, and she is legally in the matri-
monial home because of the latter and not because "of any contract
or licence".15 Hence, the House of Lords has held that a wife is not
a licensee of her husband but that she derived her right to occupy
the matrimonial home because she was in fact a wife; and secondly,
12 Woodcock (Jess B.) and Sons Ltd. v. Hobbs, [19551 1 W.L.R. 152, [1955J
1 All E.R. 445 (C.A.).
13 A. G. Guest, Licence of the Deserted Wife to Occupy the Matrimonial
Home-Third Party Purchasers (1955), 33 Can. Bar Rev. 609, at pp. 611, 612.
14 Bendall v. McW ~irter, [19521 1 All E.R. 1307 (C.A.).
15 N.P.B. v. Ainsworth, supra, footnote 1, at p. 477, per Lord Hodson;
p. 483 per Lord Upjohn; and also at p. 492 per Lord Wilberforce where he
states: "The essential point is that the wife had no right to be provided
with or kept in, any particular home; her rights were not rights in rem,
nor were they related to any particular property; they were purely personal
rights against her husband, enforceable by proceeding against his person,
which he could satisfy by rendering her conjugal rights, i.e. by living with
her and supporting her in a suitable home."
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that she had no legal or equitable interest in the matrimonial home
good against third parties such as the husband's trustee in bank-
ruptcy, or a purchaser or mortgagee from him, even with actual or
constructive notice of the desertion.
This decision will certainly have far-reaching effects both in
England and in Canada. In England, four areas covered by the case
deserve comment: (a) the effect on the licence theory, (b) the effect
on the equity theory, and (c) the relation of the decision to the Rent
Restriction cases, and (d) its effect on the Land Registration Act,
1925, s. 70(1) (g) 16 and the Married Women's Property Act, 1882,
s. 17.17
The House of Lords has clearly stated that a wife is not a licensee
of her husband.18 Lord Wilberforce emphatically concludes that
"neither contractual licences nor those licences where money has been
expended by the licensee . . afford any useful analogy or basis on
which to determine the character of the wife's rights".1 9 In fact their
lordships did not consider whether contractual licences can create
an equitable interest that would be binding on all except for pur-
chasers for value without notice. Both Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilber-
force seem to imply that a licensee, as in the case of Errington v.
Errington,20 might have an interest in the real property as in those
cases where one spends money on another's property and thereby
acquires an interest therein. It is submitted that the present case
under discussion has little effect on the doctrine of licence but there
are strong implications that the latter doctrine is based on weak
grounds so that the House of Lords may overrule the principle that
contractual licences are binding on successors in title. Their Lord-
ships make no explicit condemnation of it. Lord Hodson at most felt
that "in this field the licence cases are unhelpful,"2' and that the
word licence was "overworked". 22 This is significant since he was a
member of the House who heard the Errington case. Lord Upjohn
16 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 25.
17 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.
18 N. P. B. v. Ainsworth, supra, footnote 1, at p. 479, per Lord Hodson:
"To describe a wife as a licensee, unless that overworked word is merely
used to describe a person lawfully on land and not a trespasser, is not only
uncomplimentary but inaccurate. She is not a person who needs any licence
from her husband to be where she has a right to be as a wife"; and also
Lord Upjohn at p. 485: "A wife does not remain lawfully in the matrimonial
home by leave or licence of her husband as the owner of the property. She
remains there because, as a result of the status of marriage, it is her right
and duty so to do and, if her husband fails in his duty to remain there, that
cannot affect her right to do so. She is not a trespasser, she is not a licensee
of her husband, she is lawfully there as a wife, the situation is one sui generis."
19 Ibid., at p. 496.
20 [1952] 1 All E.R. 149. The facts of the case are: The licensees were
husband and wife. They were in occupation of a house owned by the husband's
father on the arrangement that the couple were to pay off the mortgage
instalments. After the husband left the wife continued to comply with the
agreement. The father died and left the house to his widow (by will) who
was also his personal representative. The widow failed in her action to obtain
possession of the house.21 N. P. B. v. Ainsworth, supra, footnote 1, at p. 479.
22 Ibid., at p. 479.
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felt that the discussion concerning contractual licences was "inter-
esting" 23 but refused to express his views as to whether an exclusive
licensee might have an interest in the land. Lord Wilberforce accepts
the actual decision of Errington v. Errington but he does not feel
that the case is of "assistance as to the transmissibility of contractual
licences".2 4 In view of the latter attitudes then, it can be easily
observed that the law lords are not antagonistic to the legal argu-
ment, but that they are apprehensive of it for it could lead to un-
foreseeable results, as it seems to have done in Bendall v. McWhirter.
It is submitted that provided the argument is not pushed too far too
quickly the doctrine will survive; otherwise, the House of Lords may
deal a death blow to it.
The distinction between an equitable interest and a "mere"
equity was discussed extensively by the House of Lords. Lord Upjohn
stipulates that an equitable interest consists of the beneficial interests
under trusts, vendor's liens, restrictive covenants, equitable mort-
gages and estate contracts.25 The "mere equity" on the other hand,
is something less definite and refers to such things as the equitable
remedy of an injunction. Lord Wilberforce states:
Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of
property, it must be defineable, indentifiable by third parties, capable
in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of
permanence or stability. The wife's right has none of these qualities;
it is characterized by the reverse of them.26
In considering the wife's portion then, the essential factor is that
she has no proprietary right to be provided with any particular home.
Her rights are not rights in rem as equitable interests are; her
rights are purely personal rights "against her husband, enforceable
by proceeding against his person, which he could satisfy by render-
ing her conjugal rights, i.e. by living with her and supporting her
in a suitable home". 27
Hence it follows that the wife can and has used the provisions
of s. 17 of the Married Women's Property Act of 1882 against her
husband but it does not follow that she is so entitled against his
successors in title. This was so held by the law lords.
As far as the rent restriction cases are concerned they seem to
have their own "special and intricate world of rent control in which
23 Ibid., at p. 489.
24 Ibid., at p. 497. "The Court of Appeal in that case seem to have treated
it simply as one of contract and not to have focused their argument on the
precise legal position of the plaintiff, i.e., whether she was the legal personal
representative or the successor in title of the licensor".
25 Ibid., at p. 488. Further on he maintains, "I myself cannot see how it
is possible for a 'mere equity' to bind a purchaser unless such an equity is
ancillary to, or dependent on, an equitable estate or interest in the land. As
Mr. Megarry has pointed out in (1955), 71 L.Q.R. 480, at p. 482, the reason
why a mere equity can be defeated by a subsequent purchaser of an 'equitable
estate' for value without notice is that the entire equitable estate passes
and it is not encumbered or burdened by a mere equity of which he has no
notice".
26 Ibid., at p. 494.
27 Ibid., at p. 492.
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the courts have had in many directions to work out empirical solu-
tions to prevent injustice being done".28 In this series of decisions
the husband's and wife's occupation has been treated as being iden-
tical so that she as a tenant benefits under the tenant's statutory
protection. Lord Wilberforce deals briefly with this group of cases
and he found that they were not relevant to the issue at hand al-
though the courts have taken steps to protect deserted wives in
possession in the latter area. However, it should be noted that in
the present case, although some judgments of the Lords proceed on
the assumption that the wife was in actual or exclusive occupation
of the house, there is no decision as to whether she in fact was or
was not.
29
Now it is necessary to turn to the Canadian scene within which
the Land Registration Act and The Married Women's Property Act
will be discussed. Mr. Justice Laskin has discussed the question of
the deserted wife's equity in the matrimonial home in the context of
Canadian case law and legislation.30 He has submitted that none of
the Canadian3 1 cases dealt directly with the problem of the deserted
wife and third party interests such as trustees in bankruptcy, mort-
gagees or purchasers.
It is submitted that the deserted wife's equity doctrine in the
matrimonial home has little or no relation to the Canadian scene.
Since, in Ontario an "equity" is not a recognizable legal interest,
it cannot be registered as an equitable interest under The Land Titles
Act. The only feasible method to put it on title is by a caution, but
a caution can only be used in respect of any "unregistered estates,
rights, interests or equities", or by "a person interested in any way
in land".3 2 But it is difficult to see how this would be possible, since,
as Mr. Justice Laskin points out, even under the most broad minded
view, the deserted wife's equity in the English cases has not even
reached the level of an interest in land. This reasoning would seem
to be quite logical especially since in Canada there is little in The
Land Titles Act comparable to the Land Registration Act, 1925, s.
28 Ibid., at p. 497, per Lord Wilberforce. Such cases are: Brown v. Draper,
[1944] 1 All E.R. 246, [1944] K.B. 309 (C.A.); Old Gate Estate Ltd. v. Alexan-
dern, [1949] 2 All E.R. 822, [1950] 1 K.B. 311 (C.A.); Middleton v. Baldock,[1950] 1 All E.R. 708, [1950] 1 K.B. 657 (C.A.); Wabe v. Taylor, [1952] 2 All
E.R. 420, [1952] 2 Q.B. 735 (C.A.).
29 Ibid., at p. 481 (Lord Hodson); p. 484 (Lord Upjohn); p. 503 (Lord
Wilberforce).
30 B. Laskin, The Deserted Wife's Equity in the Matrimonial Home: A
Dissent (1961-62), 14 U. Toronto L.J. 67.
31 Since the introduction of the English case law there have been six
cases on the topic. Carnochan v. Carnochan, [1955] S.C.R. 669, dealt with
the marriage relationship with regard to husband and wife and their posses-
sion and payment for use of the home. The cases of Rush v. Rush (1960),
24 D.L.R. (2d) 248 (Ont. C.A.), and Jollow v. Jollow, [1954] O.R. 895 (C.A.),
discussed the problem in relation to a partition action between a wife and
husband. Willoughby v. Willoughby, [1960] O.R. 276 (C.A.), dealt with the
problem of a deserted husband. Thompson v. Thompson, [1961] S.C.R. 3, was
a case based on the family assets doctrine which is based on the same judicial
discretion as the deserted wife's equity.32 The Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 204, ss. 76, 135.
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70 (1) (g).33 The net result is therefore that the doctrine does
not exist; but if it does then under the land titles system, the interest
in the land could be protected by filing a caution. Under The Registry
Act,34 since the interest does not arise under a specific type of instru-
ment, there is a problem of how to protect the matrimonial home
from a sale to a subsequent bona fide purchaser. However, the
Registry Act defines "instrument" under s. 1(d) as including "every
.. *instrument whereby land may be transferred, disposed of,
charged, encumbered or affected in any wise, affecting land in On-
tario." It is therefore conceivable that the interest is within the
definition. 35 If it were not included, then the next best solution
would be to use The Custody of Documents Act,36 which provides
for the deposit of any "document". The Act provides for a deposit
index, and for entering notice of the deposit on the abstract affect-
ing the land to which the deposited document pertains. The Act also
specifically states that the deposit is not a registration; however,
the deposit of a document under this provision could be interpreted
as sufficient notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser.
In addition, it is now safe to say that the deserting husband
may not in his position as owner or tenant force his wife out of
the matrimonial home except through an order of the court under
s. 17 of the Married Women's Property Act.37 The latter presumption
is based on the fact that the real problem in Canada is the same as
that of the English counterpart, namely what are the possibilities
of wrongfully removing the wife by some other method-by the
husband or by a third party. It is submitted that provided the
Ontario Act's section 12 is not interpreted as a type of procedure
"concealing and revealing substance," or as Lord Denning M.R.
put it in his judgment in the lower court, "substantive law has a
33 The section provides as follows: "All registered land shall, unless
under the provisions of this Act the contrary is expressed on the register,
be deemed to be subject of the following overriding interests as may be for
the time being subsisting in reference thereto, and such interests shall not
be treated as incumbrances within the meaning of this Act (that is to say):
S.. (g) The rights of every person in actual occupation of the land or In
receipt of the rents and profits thereof, save where inquiry is made of such
person and the rights are not disclosed, . .
34 R.S.O. 1960, c. 348.
35 Quaere, however, whether an instrument setting forth a wife's claim
to an equity in the matrimonial home evidences an actual transfer of land
so as to constitute an "instrument" within the meaning of the Registry Act,
or merely states what has transpired by reason of some previous "transac-
tion", cf. Ontario Industrial Loan v. Lindsay, 3 Q.R. 75.
36 R.S.O. 1960, c. 85.
37 The Ontario legislation is The Married Women's Property Act, R.S.O.
1960, c. 229. The corresponding section is s. 12 (i): "In any question between
husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property, either party
... may apply in a summary way to a judge of the Supreme Court or at
the option of the appellant irrespectively of the value of the property indispute, to the judge of the county or district court of the county or district
in which either party resides, and the judge may make such order with respect
to the property in dispute and as to the costs of and consequent on the
application as he thinks fit or may direct the application to stand over from
time to time, and any inquiry or issue touching the matters in question to be
made or tried in such manner as he thinks fit".
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habit of being secreted in the interstices of procedure", then there
is no reason why the Canadian courts would not follow the House
of Lords decision and maintain that a third party interest has priority
over any "equity" which the deserted wife may claim and that the
husband's remedy is directly under s. 12 of the Act. Hence, the
husband could request the court under s. 12 of The Married Women's
Property Act, to make an order regarding the occupation of the
matrimonial home; but it is clear that the husband's successors in
title could not ask for direct relief under the Act.
The significance and substance of the present case under com-
ment was foreshadowed by the learned trial judge's decision wherein
he points out:
Her equity is not anything that can properly be described as a right
in rem at all but is simply a right to appeal to the court for protection
against unconsciousable conduct on the part of the husband's successor
in title ... But to say that some successor in title of the husband has
no higher right to possession of the house than the husband would have
is one thing: to say that the wife has a correlative legal right in respect
to the house is another.38
Fortunately, the House of Lords has basically followed the latter
view and it is quite clear now that the deserted wife's equity is more
of a "personal fetter" on the husband than a substantive right of
the wife.
One of the foremost pressures encouraging the emergence of
the wife's equity in England was the gap left by the abolition of
dower. Mr. Justice Laskin has submitted that: "In England where
there is no longer any dower, and which knows neither homestead
legislation nor a regime of community property, the support of the
wife's equity can only be ascribed to judicial chivalry. '39 It is sub-
mitted that in Canada there is no such void that would lead to a
"discovery" such as that of Denning M.R. In Western Canada, home-
stead legislation requires the husband to obtain the consent of his
wife to any disposition inter vivos of the matrimonial home, except
in unusual circumstances when an order of the court dispenses with
such consent. On the death of the husband provision is made for
the wife to share in her husband's realty. In Quebec, the protection
afforded a wife through the rules relating to community of property
seems adequate. As far as the rest of Canada is concerned, one still
has the inchoate right of dower in the wife which will protect the
wife from most injustices she might encounter when a husband be-
comes seized of a freehold of inheritance during coverture. In fact, the
problem of the deserted wife's equity is really an academic question
in view of the House of Lords' decision, and also in view of the infre-
quent cases in Canada, especially in Ontario. The lack of any over-
whelming housing problem, the presence of dower and homestead
legislation and the number of low rental homes subsidized by the
38 National Provincial Bank v. Hastings Car Mart Ltd., [1963] 2 W.L.R.
1015 (Ch.D.), at p. 1021.
39 Supra, footnote 30, at p. 74.
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federal government will definitely weigh against any Canadian doc-
trine of the deserted wife's equity in the matrimonial home.
A further aspect of the case, which is treated as academic in
England by Lords Hodson and Upjohn, is whether proceedings could
be taken between husband and wife for possession of property out-
side the terms of the Married Women's Property Act of 1882.40 The
latter issue was essentially based on the view that the English doc-
trine of the wife's equity in the matrimonial home resulted from
the matrimonial obligation of support, and therefore, any action for
recovery of land should fall within the Act of 1882, since a husband
could not sue his wife in tort. Since the Law Reform (Husband and
Wife) Act, 196241 now allows husband and wife to sue one another
in tort, the law lords treat the area superficially and academic. But
in Canada, there is no comparable legislation and it has been held
in Minaker v. Minaker42 (as in England) that a claim in evict a wife
is the tort action of ejectment and so a form of trespass; therefore,
she could be evicted only by use of s. 12 of the Ontario Married
Women's Property Act. Since in Ontario the spouses cannot sue each
other in tort, as provided by s. 7 of The Married Women's Property
Act, and since one of the results of the Ainsworth case is that the
wife is lawfully in possession and not a trespasser, no question of
tort arises. It is submitted that whether in fact the contemporary
action for recovery of land is tortious in nature or not, in either
case the action would have to be brought under s. 12 of the Married
Women's Property Act. It is further submitted that in any event,
[sjince this procedure is available whether a wife be deserted or not,
it is difficult to see how it either yields or supports a resulting equity
of a proprietary character in a wife merely because she is deserted and
remains in the husband's house.43
It is therefore submitted that no prospect exists of s. 12 being the
source concealing and revealing substance for obtaining property
rights; in view of the House of Lords' decision, the matter can be
treated as academic in Ontario.
In conclusion, it is submitted that due to the pressures of the
economic, political and social spheres, as well as simple expediency,
the legislature will remain inactive because of the scarcity of cases
in Canada, and because the Canadian courts can now use the decision
of the House of Lords in N.P.B. v. Ainsworth as a guide. The basic
question now is "how to balance the need to give the wife some
temporary security (pending a permanent solution of the domestic
difficulties) against the legitimate interests of a purchaser or a
landlord".44 It is undoubtedly true that the courts will in the future
40 Supra, footnote 17.
41 10 & 11 Eliz. 2 c. 48.
42 [1949] S.C.R. 397.
44 Ian F. G. Baxter, The Law of Domestic Relations 1948-1958 (1958),
36 Can. Bar Rev. 299.
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be expeditious and grant the deserted wife compassion. But fortu-
nately, this interest will not conflict with the real need to keep real
property transactions in a simple straight forward form.45
PAUL D. TEMELINI:
RE MOORE AND TEXAcO CANADA LTD., [1965] 2 O.R. 253, 50 D.L.R.
(2d) 300 (Ont. C.A.)-MORTGAGE-OPTION TO PURCHASE TO MORT-
GAGEE-WHETHER INCONSISTENT WITH THE RIGHT TO REDEEM-
WHETHER COLLATERAL TERMS OPPRESSIVE-MORTGAGE IRREDEEMABLE
FOR 25 YEARS-STATUTORY RIGHT TO REDEEM.-In the recent case of
Re Moore and Texaco Canada Ltd.,' the High Court of Ontario was
confronted with a mortgage transaction involving terms and condi-
tions which the courts have customarily viewed with suspicion when
found in a mortgage document. Charles Moore agreed to purchase
from Texaco Canada Limited a service station in the City of Ottawa
and to perfect the transaction five documents were signed by him.
First, he signed an offer to purchase the service station and by the
terms of the offer he agreed to sell only Texaco products at the
service station for 25 years.2 Second, he completed an application
to Texaco for a mortgage loan wherein he agreed to a tie-in pro-
vision for a term of 25 years and also agreed to grant Texaco an
option to repurchase the service station for $29,200, and to grant
Texaco a right of first refusal on any offer tendered to Moore. Third,
Texaco granted the property to Moore in a deed made in pursuance
of The Short Forms of Conveyances Act,3 which contained no reser-
vations or conditions. Fourth, by a mortgage granted by Moore to
Texaco for the unpaid purchase price the mortgagor waived the pro-
vision of the Interest Act,4 s. 10, and The Mortgages Act,5 s. 16,
and an agreement of even date was declared to be incorporated into
the mortgage. On a page added to the back of the mortgage, Moore
granted Texaco an option to purchase the property for $29,200. Fifth,
by an agreement of even date with the mortgage Moore again agreed
to a tie-in provision for twenty-five years, agreed that the mortgage
was to be irredeemable for 25 years, that the property was to be used
primarily as a service station and granted the company the right to
45 Since the case, the English High Court has decided Holden v. Holden(1965), 109 Sol. Journal 1028, (1965) 12 Current Law, No. 336a. A wife suc-
cessfully obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting her husband from
selling the matrimonial home after deserting her. The husband owned the
land subject to a mortgage to a bank. N.P.B. v. Ainsworth did not deny the
wife's personal right to stay in the home, and in the absence of any evidence
that the bank might exercise its rights upon default of mortgage payments,
the wife was entitled to the injunction while her application under the
Married Woman's Property Act came on for hearing.
Mr. Temelini is a second year student at the Osgoode Hall Law School.
[ 1965] 2 O.R. 253, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 300 (Ont. H.C.).2 Hereinafter referred to as a "tie-in provision".
3 R.S.O. 1950, c. 360.
4 R.S.C. 1952, c. 156.
5 R.S.O. 1960, c. 245.
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